China’s latest South China Sea shocks reopen old wounds

Scarborough Shoal's new Chinese structures cast doubts on the reliability of the United States and raise the possibility of another military sea base. The most recent tensions in the South China Sea are concentrated close to the Philippines, but the shock waves have reverberated throughout a number of nations. The new bump in tensions results from two developments in late May and early June.

 First, the Philippine government announced the appearance of several large objects in Scarborough Shoal (known in the Philippines as Bajo de Masinloc or Panatag Shoal), presumably placed there by China, which has effectively controlled the atoll since 2012, even though it is well within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the Philippines.

 China's "10-dash line" territorial claim and China's exclusion of Filipino fishermen from the shoal were both invalidated in a 2016 arbitration decision by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, but Beijing rejected that decision. The new objects observed within the shoal include two large buoys with antennae and a floating platform that once had six personnel aboard.  China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on June 5 asserting China's right to "scientific research," but it did not confirm or deny responsibility. That assertion was reiterated in a statement on June 9, and the Philippines was also accused of making "false accusations." It seemed a case of “tell me you’re responsible without telling me you’re responsible.”

 The second set of incidents began with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi announcing on May 28 that they would hold bilateral talks to delineate the two countries’ EEZs, excluding Taiwan, which lies between the Philippines and Japan.

 China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman said on June 7, “The so-called delimitation negotiations between Japan and the Philippines are entirely illegal and invalid.”   On June 1 and June 8, Beijing sent the Chinese Coast Guard and other PRC government vessels to patrol the waters east of Taiwan. According to Chinese sources, these patrols were carried out in response to the talks between Japan and the Philippines. China’s use of law enforcement rather than naval ships for these operations signaled this was a sovereignty claim.  

The designated patrol area significantly extended beyond China's own 10-dash line claim. Taiwan's coast guard responded by deploying its own vessels in response to the Chinese ships' presence near the island nation's east coast. Taipei also said that the Chinese ships talked to some commercial ships in the area over the radio and asked them where they were coming from, where they were going, and what they were carrying. China’s fear of Japan

 There are many layers of context surrounding the strong Chinese reaction to Japan's negotiations with the Philippines regarding EEZs near Taiwan. Observers in China are keenly aware of and profoundly worried about Japan gradually shedding the constraints imposed on its military capabilities and posture by the US-drafted postwar “peace constitution.”

 This movement has accelerated since the outbreak of the Ukraine war — a fitting consequence of China’s diplomatic and material support for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aggression.

 Therefore, the Japanese remilitarization and Japan's alleged goal of re-conquering the region, as if nothing has changed since the 1940s, serve as the starting point for analyzing Japanese foreign policy for the Chinese government and its Chinese media and academic mouthpieces. The possibility that Japan might assist in defending Taiwan against a Chinese attempt to forcibly annex it is a more specific Chinese fear. Beijing has been on high alert since the ascension of Sanae Takaichi to the position of Japan’s prime minister in October 2025. 

 The Chinese knew her as an advocate for completing Shinzo Abe’s quest to revise the Japanese constitution.   China was therefore primed to overreact when, in November, she said publicly that a Chinese attack on Taiwan might lead to Japan taking military action under the principle of collective self-defense.

 The Taiwan scenario also causes the Chinese to view the recent increase in security cooperation between Japan and the Philippines with great alarm, as the two countries bracket Taiwan.  The September 2025 Reciprocal Access Agreement allows Japanese military forces to deploy into the Philippines, as they did during joint exercises the following October. 

 Japan participated in the Balikatan exercise in May and launched an anti-ship Type 88 missile from Philippine soil. Manila and Tokyo are discussing the transfer of Abukuma-class destroyers to the Philippines, now legal under Japan’s newly liberalized rules for arms exports.  The two countries are also negotiating intelligence sharing.

 The perception of growing security cooperation between Japan and another regional country threatened by China seems to be the core issue for Beijing.  China will "further advance its exercise of jurisdiction in waters east of the Taiwan island in the future" if Tokyo and Manila "go further in their illegal collusion," according to a commentary published by the Global Times, which is run by the Chinese Communist Party. Ironically, this appears to put neighbors who are banding together to fight Chinese expansionism at risk of being attacked by more Chinese expansionism.

 The Global Times commentary also contained what may be the first instance of Beijing invoking its interpretation of the Trump-Xi summit in May, as the article implicitly calls on the US to stop Japan-Philippines collaboration because of the “important consensus” on “stability” reached by Trump and Xi.

 The Tokyo-Manila EEZ negotiation amplifies a schism in Taiwan’s domestic politics.  The opposition Kuomintang (KMT) is dominated by the descendants of mainland Chinese who suffered through the Japanese invasion of China and then fled to Taiwan after the war to escape Mao’s communist takeover. 

 They are more anti-Japan than the ethnic Chinese whose ancestors lived in Taiwan before and during the war, and who now belong to or support the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).  Politicians from the KMT say that the DPP government, which is in charge, is too pro-Japan. Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release on May 31 stating that it "looks forward to cooperating with Japan and the Philippines" in "maintaining the maritime security of the Indo-Pacific region" and "commends" Japan and the Philippines for their EEZ talks. 

Opposition politicians immediately criticized the ruling government for supporting the Tokyo-Manila negotiations rather than immediately issuing a protest, seeing this as another instance of excessive Japanophilia by the DPP.  One KMT legislator called the Japan-Philippine talks a “loss of sovereignty and national humiliation” for Taiwan.

 Apparently chastened, a Taiwan government spokesman made a stronger statement on June 2, saying Taipei would consult with Japan and the Philippines and insist on the protection of Taiwan’s fishing rights.

 Scarborough and US reliability

 Scarborough Shoal has a fraught history.  In 2012, the Philippine government discovered Chinese fishing boats anchored at the shoal and, upon inspecting them, reportedly found evidence of illegal fishing. 

 The arrival of two Chinese maritime patrol vessels slowed the fishermen's arrest. The Philippines attempted to calm things down by bringing in a coast guard vessel in place of its navy vessel after a heated standoff that lasted for months. The Chinese, on the other hand, bolstered their position with a third ship. More ships from both sides eventually arrived. The fishermen avoided prosecution as Chinese ships escorted them out of the shoal.

 In order to save face, the US government came to an agreement in which both sides would withdraw all of their ships. The Chinese did not, whereas the Philippines did. They claimed there was no agreement and were accused of reneging. China has effectively occupied the shoal ever since.

 Some Filipinos and Americans still hold the opinion that the United States did not provide enough support for its ally in order to avoid deteriorating relations with China, and the incident that occurred in 2012 remains a source of contention. As a result, the governments of the United States and the Philippines have insisted that China cannot construct on Scarborough. This was referred to as "Our red line" by Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Alan Peter Cayetano in 2018.

Because of China's previous pattern of "creeping expansionism" through gray-zone salami-slicing, the discovery of substantial pieces of Chinese equipment in the lagoon of Scarborough Shoal is alarming for observers in the region. In the 1990s, a collection of fragile huts on stilts marked the beginning of the Chinese occupation of another atoll, Mischief Reef. On 1,380 acres of reclaimed land, it now has a 2,600-meter airstrip and numerous concrete buildings. China has violated an agreement with Seoul by placing steel structures in the Yellow Sea where the EEZs of the two countries overlap, presumably to unilaterally advance China's sovereignty claims. 

The floating structures are a reasonable first step in a process that, in the eyes of observers, normalizes the gradual Chinese development of the atoll, similar to the metaphor of the slowly boiling frog. Manila should be concerned that China intends to build another military outpost on Scarborough Shoal. Scarborough was designated a national nature reserve by China in 2025. That, however, was more an assertion of Chinese sovereignty than a reason to believe environmentalist sentiment will restrain Beijing from converting the atoll into a military base.  China has thought nothing of destroying or damaging an estimated 20,000 acres of marine habitat in the building of its artificial islands elsewhere in the South China Sea.

 Why would the Chinese want a base at Scarborough?  First, it would fill out China’s strategic leverage in the middle of the South China Sea, complementing the other bases on Woody Island, Subi Reef, Fiery Cross Reef and Mischief Reef. 

 These four leave a coverage gap close to Luzon, the primary home island of the Philippines. That gap would be closed by Scarborough. The atoll is close to the edge of China's 10-dash line and a sealane frequented by bulk carriers, tankers, and container ships traveling through the South China Sea. Second, establishing a base at Scarborough would bolster Beijing's message to Manila that the United States will not protect you from China's inevitable rise to regional sheriffship. The Chinese reinstalled a floating barrier across the shoal's entrance in April, possibly because Washington was focused on the war against Iran. More importantly, the Trump administration is clearly very interested in securing a major bilateral trade deal with China.  As a result, Beijing might see this year as a good time to test the Scarborough red line. Consequences of the Code of Conduct The most recent incident at Scarborough may make it even more difficult for the nations pursuing disputed territorial claims in the South China Sea to develop a code of conduct. Two decades have passed since negotiations began. Key sticking points have arisen from several Chinese demands. 

  As a warning sign, China wants the Code to be a guide rather than a law. The Chinese delegation says the Code must accept the principle of “historical usage” as a basis for territorial sovereignty claims.  For its own claims, China has relied heavily on this principle. Some Southeast Asian governments, however, want to follow the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which rejects the historical usage argument.  Beijing wants the group to rely on consensus or bilateral consultations rather than a clear arbitration mechanism to settle future disputes. 

 Lastly, despite the fact that some nations in Southeast Asia welcome these outside forces as safeguards against Chinese dominance, China insists on restricting the presence and activity of foreign military forces in the South China Sea, such as those of the United States and its allies. A requirement that claimant states not unilaterally advance their claims by means such as inhabiting currently uninhabited islands, reefs, or rocks is almost certainly included in the secret draft Code of Conduct that is being negotiated. This principle is included in the 2012 Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea, which is a warm-up for the Code of Conduct and to which the PRC is a signatory.

 China's most recent action at Scarborough rekindles suspicions that the entire exercise is pointless and that Beijing will ignore any provisions it finds inconvenient, even if all participants agree to a Code of Conduct. These occurrences near the Philippines highlight three 2026 regional trends. Regional governments are doing more to balance against China than to accommodate Beijing amid doubts about the US's reliability as a protector (though resistor and accommodationist political parties are pulling Taiwan's policy in different directions). Japan, in particular, is taking on a more regional leadership role as a security provider.   Additionally, the majority of the rest of the region is increasingly at odds with China's strategic agenda.

Writer: Binod Kumar Simkhada

binodkumarsimkhada315@gmail.com