Nepal: Democracy, Disorder, And The Battle For Renewal – Analysis
Writer: Binod Kumar Simkhada
Struggle for Rebirth: During the Nepali Congress (NC)'s second Special General Convention (SGC), which was held at Bhrikutimandap in Kathmandu on January 15, 2026, senior leader Gagan Kumar Thapa won the election to be President of the NC. He did not face any competition. The SGC was convened with the backing of over 60 per cent of general convention delegates. At 12:30 a.m., Election Committee Coordinator Sitaram KC made the announcement of the results.
The Election
Commission concluded that the event was carried out in accordance with the
party statute and the law on January 16, 2026, when it formally recognized
Gagan Kumar Thapa as the President of the NC and updated its records with the
information regarding the office bearers elected from the SGC. Acting Chief
Election Commissioner Ram Prasad Bhandari said the commission relied on three
key grounds to decide on updating the party’s details:
The NC statute allows
40 per cent of general convention delegates to demand a special general
convention, and the commission found that such a convention had been held as
mandated.
The law makes it clear that the delegates to the general convention are the party's highest authority, and their decisions are legally binding. The commission confirmed that the special general convention was held in accordance with the statute by noting that there was no recorded opposition to the request. With the Commission’s decision, all resolutions passed by the SGC held from January 11 to 14 gained legal recognition.
An internal dispute became an institutional schism when the Election Commission recognized Thapa's faction as the official NC, bringing back memories of the party's traumatic splits in 1953 and 2002. The Nepali Congress crisis was not resolved by the recognition of Gagan Kumar Thapa's leadership by the Election Commission. Instead, it formalised a party split, with the ousted leadership coalescing into a rival faction under Sher Bahadur Deuba. The SGC was criticized by Deuba and his backers as "unconstitutional, coercive, and in violation of the party statute" for not being legitimate.
Following the EC's decision, the Deuba group is now challenging their status as a "dissident" or "breakaway" faction, even though they used to be the "Establishment" faction. Deuba has accused the Thapa camp of "engineering a party takeover under the cover of street pressure and institutional manipulation." He has made it clear that he is still the "legitimate president elected by the 14th General Convention." Dr. Purna Bahadur Khadka and other senior leaders are among the most prominent supporters of Deuba. Arjun Narsingh KC, Shekhar Koirala, Bimalendra Nidhi, and a number of former ministers and provincial-level party leaders are among the candidates. Parts of the party's traditional organizational base, particularly older cadres, rural committees, and patronage network leaders, continue to be influenced by the faction.
The
Deuba faction has been employing a dual strategy since the middle of January
2026: initiating legal challenges against the decision made by the Election
Commission and mobilizing supporters through parallel party meetings, protest
statements, and threats of street agitation. Because of this, there is now
effectively a situation of dual authority, with two competing centers of power
claiming that the NC legacy will continue. Rather than resolving the leadership
dispute, the institutional recognition of Thapa’s faction has, therefore,
deepened the schism, transforming an internal party conflict into a structural
fracture with implications for electoral coherence, opposition politics, and
overall political stability in the run-up to the March 2026 elections.
It is useful to recall here that around 1952–1953, shortly after the party’s early years post-democracy, a leadership dispute mainly between Bishweshwar Prasad Koirala (BP Koirala) and Matrika Prasad Koirala over government formation and direction led to factional tensions and a split within the party. This was considered the first significant break in NC’s history during the early democratic period.
Later, in 2002, in a deep dispute during the Maoist insurgency era, the then-Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba dissolved the House of Representatives (HoR), extended the state of emergency without full party consensus, and was expelled by the party’s disciplinary committee. On September 22, 2002, this culminated in Deuba's group registering separately as NC (Democratic).
However, on September
25, 2007, the NC (Democratic) regrouped with the NC, bringing the two groups
back together. Back to the present day, the NC split is a defining moment in
the country's political trajectory following the Gen Z upheaval. What unfolded
in January 2026 was not simply another episode of factional infighting but a
convergence of generational revolt, institutional decay, and contested
geopolitical narratives that together threaten to hollow out the NC’s historic role
as a stabilizing force in Nepal’s fragile republic.
The split in NC was
the result of:
Long-term factional
rivalry
Leadership
authoritarianism
Disagreements regarding crisis response; internal democratic norms that fail. In fact, the
structural contradictions that have existed for a long time are the source of
this conflict. Public trust was weakened, particularly among younger voters, by
years of unstable coalitions, ambiguous ideology, and poor governance. This
crisis was exacerbated by the Gen Z uprising in September 2025, which toppled
the KP Oli government amid widespread protests against censorship and
corruption. NC came out of the turmoil weak and internally polarized, divided
and receptive. For reformists, the uprising underscored the urgency of renewal;
for the old guard, it represented a destabilizing force to be managed rather
than embraced.
This reformist era's
symbolic center was Gagan Thapa. His appeal lies in a discourse of
accountability, service delivery, and institutional reform that resonates with
urban, educated constituencies. However,
critics attribute his rise to external manipulation, pointing to previous
WikiLeaks cables that identified him as a U.S. Contact with the embassy and
with Western-funded democracy and youth programs in Nepal. From this point of
view, the Western strategy to combat Chinese and Indian influence is seen as
part of Thapa's alignment with reformist tropes and Gen Z rhetoric. Such
claims, however, remain strongly contested.
Nepal's political spectrum regularly engages with foreign
diplomats, and there is no clear evidence of organizational control linking
Thapa to decentralized Gen Z activism. Party politics and co-optation are
deeply skewed by the youth movement itself. Thapa may take advantage of the anti-elite
mood that is currently in place, but he does not command it, and any perception
of opportunism could quickly damage his credibility. The path ahead is
dangerous. While Deuba's camp responds with street protests and legal
challenges, an NC led by Thapa seeks to capitalize on youth discontent and
organizational legitimacy ahead of elections. The party may become paralyzed as
a result of prolonged litigation or additional fragmentation, giving space to
rivals and escalating systemic instability. In the end, the NC division is
indicative of a larger legitimacy crisis in Nepal's political system.
This implosion may
not only be an exception but also a sign of broader political unraveling if
there is no genuine internal democratization, improved institutional
performance, and meaningful youth inclusion. The most violent episodes in
Nepal's recent political history, the Gen Z protest movement on September 8 and
9, 2025, which revealed the rift between the country's political elite and the
general public, are compounded by these developments. The Gen Z protests turned
public resentment that had lain dormant into an unprecedented mass uprising. The
movement quickly developed into a broader rebellion against corruption,
political dynasties, economic stagnation, and ingrained impunity, despite the
fact that the government's September 8, 2025 ban on multiple social media
platforms was the immediate trigger. What began as student-led demonstrations
in Kathmandu quickly spread across major urban centres, overwhelming an
unprepared and internally divided state apparatus.
According to reports,
on September 8, 2025, tens of thousands of people gathered in Kathmandu at
Maitighar Mandala and New Baneshwor for a protest led by civic activist Sudan
Gurung and organized by the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Hami Nepal.
What started out as a peaceful rally turned violent when some protesters tried
to break into the federal parliament complex and got into fights with police.
Rubber bullets, live ammunition, tear gas, and water cannons were used by the
police to respond. Later, video evidence proved that gunfire killed many
protesters, including students, with at least 19 deaths reported that day. In
the evening, a social media ban was lifted, and the Home Minister resigned. However,
on September 9, 2025, nationwide violence increased.
Prime Minister K.
P. Sharma Oli quit his job and
ran away to an Army barracks. Major state institutions, offices of political
parties, and the homes of leaders were set on fire by protesters. Over 13,000
inmates were able to flee after being attacked in prisons all over the country.
The Army took control as airports were shut and politicians evacuated. Army patrols restored some order by September
10, 2025, while protesters discussed interim leadership online.
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