If Nepal builds credible
governance rooted in national capability, it can move beyond being an arena of
geopolitical competition.
Nepal is a
mid-state between two major Asian powers—India and China. It has
historically received consistent attention from Russia and the United States.
They express public support for Nepal's well-being, but each pursues its own
goals. In Nepal, these interests are frequently discussed but rarely examined
in isolation. Geography, water resources, and political engagement have shaped
India's interest in Nepal.
Nepal has been
considered a part of New Delhi's northern security belt ever since the Treaty of
Peace and Friendship was signed in 1950. Nepal's political transitions,
political movements, and internal politics have been closely monitored by
Indian intelligence networks. Its concerns have primarily been strategic. After
Tibet joined the People's Republic of China, China's interest grew. Preventing
Tibetan refugee networks from engaging in anti-China political activities
through Nepal has been Beijing's primary concern. Chinese involvement grew over
time to include party-to-party relations and infrastructure connectivity in
addition to border security.disequilibrium.
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They recall the
2008 Summer Olympics held in China in Beijing. This year, Lhasa saw sporadic
violent riots that included arson, property damage, and death. In order to
guarantee the safe passage of the Olympic torch over the summit of Mt.
Sagarmatha, Nepal provided China with all security assistance. Through numerous
exchanges, China aims to strengthen people-centered and intergenerational
public diplomacy today. As part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Beijing
backs Nepal's desire for trans-Himalayan connectivity across the region.
The end goal seems to be
a Nepal that is independent, stable, and restricts activities that threaten
China's core interests. The United States has traditionally viewed Nepal
through the lens of democratic governance and strategic inter-regional balance
in Asia. American interests in Nepal were more closely associated with
Tibetan operations and Himalayan surveillance during the Cold War.
Washington
placed a new emphasis on democratic institutions, development assistance,
military cooperation, and expanded strategic Pacific objectives following the
Cold War. The geopolitical connections of American support for Millennium
Challenge Corporation projects have permeated development priorities. With its
extended Pacific Strategy, the United States wants Nepal to have international
ties and continue to support the Tibetan government in exile in India. From
Taiwan to the Himalayas, China sees this as part of a larger strategic
encirclement.
Nepal was a
significant part of the relationship that the Soviet Union and Russia had with
Nepal. Soviet engagement focused on educational exchanges, industrial
cooperation, and diplomatic balancing in South Asia, and support for scientific
and technical training. The primary lens through which Soviet-linked
institutions observed political developments was competition with the
West.
In the 1980s, the Soviet
Union's large embassy complex in Baluwatar, close to the residence of the Prime
Minister, served as a symbol of its visibility. In addition, during this time,
the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, paid a
visit to Nepal amid intense rivalry between the superpowers and praised Nepal's
"courageous" position on issues such as the Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan. Infrastructure, energy, transportation, education, and
multilateral cooperation are still areas of interest for Russia today. Through
the UN, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and broader Eurasian initiatives
linked to the BRI, it remains connected to Nepal.
The geopolitical
interests of major powers have frequently had an impact on Nepal's tragedy as
well as its opportunities. It has frequently been perceived that a portion of
the political class, bureaucracy, media, business community, and civil society
are aligned with one or more foreign power centers. Public mistrust and
partisan interpretations of governments and their external relationships have
been fueled by such perceptions.
Communication itself
becomes an instrument of influence in this setting. Nepal's intelligentsia is
becoming more aware of the fact that outside powers operate not only through
formal diplomacy but also through narratives, advisory networks, secretive private
conversations, and economic relationships that are rarely subject to prolonged
public scrutiny. Against this background, Balen Shah's administration as Prime
Minister would be a potentially pivotal political moment. His public image is
associated with technological governance, anti-corruption messaging, digital
communication, administrative independence, and opposition to established
patronage networks. He has a reputation for carrying out particular
consultations within private ecosystems.
The traditional
political channels through which foreign powers have frequently interacted with
Nepal's political actors and shaped public opinion could be disrupted by such a
leadership model. India would probably adjust pragmatically to a leadership
that maintains stability and avoids positions that are hostile to India. China
would try to improve economic and infrastructure cooperation while figuring out
if local leadership could clearly fix too much strategic disequilibrium.
If his administration
adheres to the extended Pacific strategic values, the United States may view it
favorably. Russia would probably continue its involvement through diplomatic,
multilateral, and development channels. However, Nepal's own political maturity
and foresight would be more important than any external powers. This would be
the most significant transformation. Stronger institutions, professional
diplomacy, and transparent strategic communication would make external
influence more balanced and manageable. Sustainable self-reliance,
bolstered by economic expansion and institutional credibility, ought to be
Nepal's long-term objective. Confident states negotiate from positions of
merit, whereas weak states invite excessive external influence.
Digital
technologies, artificial intelligence, and information ecosystems are likely to
shape Nepal's geopolitical competition over the next five years. India and
China's growing cooperation will also continue to have an impact on the
Himalayan and Asia-Pacific landscapes, resulting in new patterns of economic
flow, social interaction, and strategic interdependence. Nepal also has a rare
opportunity because the younger generation is increasingly looking for
governance that is based on performance, accountability, and delivery rather
than just rhetoric.
The real test will
be how future governments, including one that might be led by the RSP, can
strike a balance between putting Nepal first and protecting national assets and
strategic autonomy. Employment, high-quality livelihoods, and the efficient use
of the country's mountains, water, land, forests, and human resources are clear
to citizens. There is no need for a zero-sum game in international relations.
When the parties acknowledge their interdependence, they can develop into
long-lasting, win-win arrangements. In a world that is becoming increasingly
interconnected, one actor's instability eventually affects others. The most
important question is not whether or not foreign powers will attempt to exert
influence; this is a given.
The difficulty
lies in determining whether Nepal's citizens, institutions, and leadership are
capable of managing those pressures with confidence and strategic clarity.
Nepal has the potential to become a stable, well-liked, and strategically
independent Himalayan state if it establishes credible governance based on
comparative national capability rather than dependence.
Writer: Binod Kumar
Simkhada
binodkumarsimkhada315@gmail.com
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